Reichsverband der Deutschen Industrie

(National Association of German Industry, RdI)

   Next to its assortment of cartels,* Ger-many's most apparent component of "organized capitalism" (regulated competition) was a sophisticated web of trade associations. An array of regional interest groups culminated at the national level in the Spitzenverbande. The largest and most powerful Spitzenverband was RdI, which held its inaugural meeting at Jena in February 1919. Initially merging the old Central Association of German Industrialists and the League of German Industrialists, RdI was a response posed by Hans von Raumer* to reorganize industry so as to meet the new circumstances (e.g., collective bargaining) presented by the formation of ZAG. Accordingly, RdI, which soon embraced most of German manufacturing, aimed at its inception to work with organized labor.

   With twenty-seven specialized groups and about one thousand professional divisions, RdI had a complex governing structure comprised of a central com-mittee (140-190 delegates from the divisions), a board of directors (30-60 mem-bers), and a presidium (16-34 members). Power rested with the presidium. Although its membership was fluid, the presidium was controlled by heavy industry, as evidenced by its 1920 membership: chairman Kurt Sorge (a Krupp director), Ewald Hilger (steel), Ernst von Borsig (heavy industrial equipment and chairman of the Employers' League), Felix Deutsch (director of General Electric), Hans Jordan (textiles), Paul Reusch,* Peter Riepert (construction), Abraham Frowein (textiles), Philipp Rosenthal (porcelains), Carl Friedrich von Siemens,* Robert Bosch,* Carl Duisberg,* Max Fischer (precision tools), Hans Kraemer (pulp and paper), Otto Moras (textiles), and Hugo Stinnes.* Such a lopsided makeup stirred periodic discord, especially over tariff policy, among members representing finishing industries. Duisberg became chairman of the presidium in 1925, while Gustav Krupp* assumed the post in 1931.

   Identified until 1930 with the DVP, RdI rejected the corporatist socialization plan proposed in 1919 by Wichard von Moellendorff* of the Economics Min-istry. Its first test came in March 1920 when, amidst the Kapp* Putsch, it was ambivalent toward the Republic's usurpers. Stinnes argued in his critique of the presidium's waffling that in future one "can only do business with democratic governments." In 1923 RdI lobbied in vain for currency reform via creation of an autonomous gold-note bank. Its leverage as an agent of heavy industry grew from 1924 with the surge in industrial concentration (see IG Farben). After ZAG's collapse in January 1924, RdI abandoned all pretense of supporting so-cial policies and urged decreased public expenditures, the privatization of public enterprises, and cuts in taxes, wages, and social programs. The depression* provoked a critique of parliamentary democracy from key RdI members. Dis-trustful in late 1932 of Kurt von Schleicher,* several RdI men reinforced the effort to form a Hitler-Papen-Hugenberg cabinet. In March 1933 the organization backed the Enabling Act* and then promised support for Hitler's emergency programs. In the NSDAP's drive to synchronize competing groups, the RdI was merged in June 1933 with the Employers' League to form the Reichsstand der deutschen Industrie.

   REFERENCES:David Abraham, Collapse of the Weimar Republic; Feldman, Great Dis-order; Feldman and Nocken, "Trade Associations"; Turner, German Big Business; Zun-kel, "Gewichtung."